concede this conclusion; what follows proposes a means of conforming the system of private control of the economy more closely to the American ideal of economic freedom in order to diminish the need for government control.
What is the American ideal of economic freedom? In a recent World Congress of legal and social philosophers Shlomo Avineri, discussing tensions between equality and freedom, called attention to a basic difference between European and American social and political institutions resulting from differing attitudes toward state power. 3 The French revolution, and other revolutions patterned on it, did not destroy absolute state power but captured and used it to guarantee political liberty for the individual. As a result, when Europeans consider the question of economic liberty they think of using state power to equalize the distribution of economic assets. Americans, on the other hand, distrusted state power and replaced colonial absolutism with limited government. As a result, Avineri said, economic liberty for Americans has meant unrestricted opportunity to be an entrepreneur. 4 This was undoubtedly true of the United States in the past. Our social and political institutions were the progeny of Western Europe, but they developed under unique conditions of openness and opportunity. Institutions of entrenched privilege were never firmly established here. Education was not controlled by an established church. Great estates were broken up during and immediately after the Revolutionary War, and rules of land holding and inheritance which served an hierarchical pattern of society were abolished by state legislatures. 5 The state intervened to guarantee fair opportunity to succeed, not to redistribute wealth.
The American economy, characterized until about 1870 by the individual entrepreneurship of small artisans and family farms, by 1900 was dominated by great aggregations of capital controlled by trusts or corporations. 6 The Sherman Act of 1890 was intended, at least by its author, to respond to "the inequality of condition, wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade and to break down competition." 7 Yet, as Harold Demsetz has pointed out, the Sherman Act as initially interpreted was "directed not toward de facto market concentration but toward acts of monopolization and restraint of trade." ' Those acts that restrain trade and, by their inherent nature or surrounding circumstances, support the inference that they were done with the intent to benefit from restricting competition were the Act's principal targets." The acts might consist of putting together great aggregations of capital in a holding company and thus controlling production, transportation, and sales in gasoline or tobacco."' But a great concentration of power, even if wrongfully achieved by acts done with the requisite intent, would not be broken up by the courts unless there was presently an intent to use the power for restrictive purposes." Government action to deconcentrate was not needed, it was said, because *... the freedom of the individual right to contract when not unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract was the means by which monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it 6 Kristol, supra note 2, at 126. 7 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman), quoted in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-39 n.1 (1945) (Hand, J.) . 8 H. DEMSETZ, THE MARKET CONCENTRATION DOCTRINE 2 (1973). Speaking of a company that had integrated 180 companies controlling 80 to 90 per cent of steel production (less than 50 per cent at time of trial), the Supreme Court said, "the law does not make mere size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence. It, we repeat, requires overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them and its power to repress or punish them. It does not compel competition nor require all that is possible." United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920) .
" Standard Oil Co. %. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-62, 70-77 (1911) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 175-84 (1911) .
1' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31-49, 70-77 (1911) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 155-175, 181-184 (1911) .
11 United States %'. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 445-457 (1920). and no right to make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted.' 2 From such small misdirections grow the dysfunctions of a later day. The problem sought to be dealt with was the "inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity" that had grown out of "the concentration of capital into vast combinations."' 3 The means chosen was prohibition of acts that unreasonably restricted competition. From then on the question was not whether in light of current conditions everyone was as free as possible to be an entrepreneur, but whether in light of current conditions competition was as free as possible. The corporate entity was as much the beneficiary as the target of antitrust enforcement. So long as conduct, not size, was to trigger the Sherman Act, it would be inconceivable that concentration was an adversary of opportunity. Protecting free competition sometimes, perhaps often, incidentally protected the opportunity to be an entrepreneur. Nevertheless, the uniquely American concern for individual opportunity 14 did not speak through the antitrust law. The language of economic freedom would continue to be used to refer to an economy increasingly dominated by giant corporate entities who demanded to be free from all restrictions upon themselves except those imposed by the market place, but who had agglomerated into their control hundreds of thousands of decisions that otherwise would have been made by independent entrepreneurs.
The focus of the antitrust laws with respect to concentration has always been on market power, not on entrepreneurial opportunity. Congress acted against incipient concentration in the Clayton Act of 1914 again by banning only discrete practices, such as exclusive dealing, tying, and corporate acquisitions of corporate stock or share capital, where the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15 The Act makes clear that control of decisionmaking in acquired corporations is to be limited only for the purpose of protecting competition. The Clayton Act's declaration that the antimerger section shall not apply in cases of purchase solely for investment is followed by this disclaimer:
Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition. a6
The Clayton Act also prohibits interlocking directors, but only if the corporations are competitors.
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If a purpose of the Clayton Act were to protect entrepreneurial opportunity-as well as to protect competition-it would contain provisions aimed at limiting concentrations of decisionmaking, doubtless balanced against countervailing economic values. As an example, there might be a provision prohibiting corporate acquisitions of stock or share capital, or the formation of subsidiary corporations, where the effect may be to restrict independent decisionmaking more than is reasonably necessary to achieve economies of scale.
By 1945 it was no longer credible to assume that the centrifugal and centripetal forces of the market would inevitably prevent concentrations so long as the government prevented anticompetitive acts. Perhaps as a consequence of this new understanding, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America"' and American Tobacco Co. v. United States 9 redirected the Sherman Act toward market concentration. In a key paragraph of his opinion in the Alcoa case, Learned Hand discussed whether monopoly power, or its misuse, was the evil sought to be prevented by the Sherman Act. He first suggested economic considerations for preferring a free market to concentrations of power, stating, among other things: "Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." 2 The economic argument against concentration was directed to protecting competition. Spurred by diligence and thrift, businesses would produce better quality goods at lower prices. The increase in entrepreneurial opportunity that would result from deconcentration would be merely an incidental benefit.
In this same remarkable paragraph, Hand also suggested a non-economic Congressional motive for the Sherman Act:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.2
Promoting entrepreneurial opportunity is conjoined with a distaste for centralized decisionmaking; these fundamental noneconomic concerns that were lost in the initial missteps in the interpretation of the Sherman Act reappear in Hand's language as purposes, not just incidental benefits, of the Act.
Yet these famous passages from Alcoa are hardly conclusive. Section 2 of the Sherman Act was viewed as comprehending the fact of concentration. Yet Judge Hand's enigmatic discussion only speculates 2 2 whether competition as an economic desideratum or individual opportunity was to be the salutary effect of attacking monopoly. The former would be simple restatement of antitrust concern for anticompetitive conduct; the latter might herald a reanimation of the American ideal of economic liberty. 2 3 Whatever Judge Hand's dicta import for the principle of opportunity, his reserving of efficiency-related defenses under section 2 indicates that the fact of market concentration alone-"monopoly in the concrete"-does not warrant government-directed deconcentration. Even if concentration is the evil to be eradicated, the imposition of criminal liability will require some non-innocent acts of acquisition or use. 2 4 Monopoly power innocently acquired, as a result of a very narrow market, changes 21 Id. 22 Judge Hand would only say that "[m]any people believe" in the pernicious effects of monopoly, text accompanying note 20 supra, and that "it is possible" to prefer a system of small producers, text accompanying note 21 supra.
23 See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
in taste or cost, or "superior skill, foresight and industry" 2 5 produced the effects of concentration sought to be avoided but did not violate the Sherman Act. And the acts of acquisition or use of concentrated market power that were said to violate the Act were all restrictions of competition. 2 6 If no anticompetitive acts were found in the acquisition and use of concentrated market power there was no violation of the Act. Alcoa left no reason to inquire whether more decisions controlling economic resources were concentrated into a single corporate structure than were reasonably necessary to gain certain benefits, such as economy of scale. Exclusion of competition was the sole consideration, not exclusion of entrepreneurial opportunity. When the Supreme Court 27 the following year in American Tobacco explicitly endorsed the reasoning and result of Alcoa, it quoted Hand's statement on stimulating competition, but then skipped to the final sentence of the paragraph, without mentioning the suggested non-economic motive. 2 8 Entrepreneurial opportunity as a purpose of the Sherman Act emerged belatedly, existed briefly, but did not survive.
To understand why the American view of economic freedom as entrepreneurial opportunity did not survive industrialization of the nation requires some exploration of the long intellectual tradition respecting the interplay of property and freedom. Traditionally, the institution of property distributes authority to make decisions about material assets. Commonly, only persons believed capable of making decisions that will benefit the whole group are permitted to make these key decisions; and indiscriminate individual ownership of material assets is permitted only in a society adhering to the belief that all persons are equally capable of making the decisions that cumulatively result in the utilization of the material assets upon which the society depends for survival and prosperity. History yields many examples of these perceptions of the relation between property and decisionmaking.
The ancient Greeks believed that the gods controlled all events, including the outcome of battles and the size of harvests. They also believed that the original founders of families had some of the power of gods to control events and that they passed this active power through the blood to the first legitimate son. The current possessor of the active power of the founder of the family, quite reasonably, was believed to be the person best capable of approaching the gods, to propitiate or appease them, or to learn their will. Accordingly, the housefather, or paterfamilias, had sole authority to make decisions in battle, domestic disputes, and economic matters.
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The Greek natural philosophers questioned the concept of a world controlled by the whimsy of the gods, and posited a world of natural cause and effect. According to the Stoics, every mature person possessed reason and therefore was equally capable of learning causes and the effects they produced. If the causes of a good crop were in the fertility and cultivation of the soil, the quality of the seed, and the presence in due measure of sun and water-and not in the actions of favorably disposed gods pushing plants up through the ground-there was no reason for any person who wished to farm to be denied authority to make decisions about the utilization of a piece of land. One person's decisions were likely to be as effective as another's. The Romans adopted the Stoic view of reality, saw its implications for distributive justice, and created a law of property that permitted indiscriminate, private land ownership. 3 0
The relationship between prevailing belief about capacity to make socially beneficial decisions and the use of property concepts to distribute decisionmaking about material assets is confirmed by the modern example of rejection of private ownership and control of material assets used for production. Marxist philosophy turns away from the natural law, humanistic belief that the world is characterized by a fixed, rational order that can be known by human beings because they are rational by nature, and adopts the view that order is not fixed, once and for all, but is constantly coming into being. For Hegel, order emerges from the process of ideas in the mind of Universal Spirit coming into objective reality in nature and in history. Marx also adopted a dynamic view of history but rejected Hegelian dialectical idealism for dialectical materialism, in which order emerges 29 N. FUSTEL from a process of responding to new objective conditions of production, such as a new technology. Most persons are able to respond only in accordance with a consciousness bound by narrow personal experience, but a few persons, according to Marxism-Leninism, can understand the full sweep and direction of the process of dialectical materialism. Only they, it is said, can understand what the present stage of the process requires in production relations, in order for social justice to prevail. Only they, therefore, should be permitted to make decisions about utilization of the material resources available to the whole society for its survival and prosperity. This is the justification for nationalization of the means of production in communist countries. 3 American society has been deeply and pervasively influenced by Locke. 32 He is of the natural law tradition, but with an eccentricity that results in special emphasis on property. The Stoics and the Roman jurisconsults based the equality of persons on equal possession of reason; Locke bases it on equal possession of dominion and sovereignty. The condition of all persons in the natural state, according to Locke, is one "of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. The law of nature is that ."being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."
3' 4 The Lockean individual, being equal to and independent of every other individual, is implicitly complete. Civil society is formed not to enable individuals to realize their full potentiality, but to enable them better to protect their property. 31 J. HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 13-33, 202-05 (4th ed. 1968 16-80 (1969) . 32 We need not have been consciously influenced. Lacking a feudal past to react against and being so much of one mind about ethics and morality we could skip the articulation of premises and get on with practical problems. See L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 3-23, 35-66, 228-55 (1955) . Hartz makes essentially the same point as Avineri, notes 3-4 supra & accompanying text. Americans did not need to resort to absolute power to free themselves from inferior status in an older, rigidly stratified society; thus we did "not understand the meaning of sovereign power" and had no socialist tradition. With whole and innocent hearts we embraced a liberalism of atomistic individualism and minimal government. L. HARTZ, supra at 5-23. By property Locke means all those things over which the individual exercises full dominion in the natural state-life, health, liberty, and possessions. According to Locke, these are the property of persons in the same way that all persons are the property of God. 5 In the natural state every individual possesses legislative and executive power over others, but only to the extent necessary to require others to observe the law of nature. 3 6 None possesses arbitrary power over another; what is not possessed can not be transferred to civil society, therefore civil society and its government cannot take property without the consent of the governed.
3 7 Indeed, "government has no other end but the preservation of property. 3 8 Locke's pervasive influence on American thought and action and the primacy of property in Locke's thought go far to explain the Supreme Court opinions that developed the doctrine of substantive due process. 3 9 Prior to the Civil War the view was generally held that freedom to make decisions about one's property, in a broad Lockean sense that includes the labor of one's body, was beyond the authority of the state to grant or to take away, but a natural law approach to vested property rights was not clearly fixed in judicial interpretation of any constitutional clause before acceptance of the fourteenth amendment. 40 In the SlaughterHouse Cases,' 4 1 in 1873, the Supreme Court majority rejected arguments that the privileges and immunities clause or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment should be interpreted to forbid the states from taking away an individual's right to engage in a particular business. 42 Justice Bradley, in a dissent joined by Justice Field, said:
Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to rights of life, liberty, and property. These are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law .... For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of these rights the individual citizen, as a necessity, must be left free to adopt such calling, profession, or trade as may seem to him most conducive to that end. Without this right he cannot be a freeman. This right to choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property and right.
[A] law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without due process of law.
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In the ensuing years the Supreme Court moved toward, and in 1897 adopted, the Bradley position, in Allgeer v. Louisiana : 44 The liberty mentioned in [the fourteenth amendment] means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
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At any time prior to 1870 it would have made sense, but was unnecessary, 6 to write into the Constitution a prohibition against government interference with the right of the individual to freely choose his calling and sell his labor or services. In an economy of small artisans and family farms, a free market could reasonably be expected to return to each individual the rough equivalent of the value of the labor, management, or capital he contributed. The opportunity to engage in business for oneself genuinely embodied the promise of the New World, manac, that anyone could gain a position of respect and substance through diligence, thrift, and individual initiative. 47 In the United States, positions in the community were open to the self-made man that in Europe could be gained only through birth or church preferment. The European literature on the meanness and greed of the petit bourgeois is alien to the tradition of Locke and Franklin in the United States. Private property is the material basis for the self-sufficient, diligent, responsible, freely contracting individual who deserves the protections of the Bill of Rights. 4 8 Unfortunately, in 1897 when the Supreme Court wrote Lockean materialistic individualism into the due process clause of the Constitution, the economy had changed from natural person capitalism to corporate capitalism. The value of the goods and services produced by a corporate participant in the market place is the cumulative result of the total contributions of capital, management, and labor of all the persons associated in the corporate enterprise. Assuming competition, the corporate enterprise will receive a return roughly equal to the total value of the labor, management, and capital it contributes to the economy, because the market will determine which competitor's goods are bought and at what price. In an economy of enterprises by natural persons, this action of the market serves to return to each person the rough equivalent of the value contributed. In the case of corporate enterprises, however, the market returns to the corporation the rough equivalent of its cumulative contribution, but does not return to each individual within the corporation the rough equivalent of his contribution. Intracorporate distribution is determined by those in control of the corporation, which by corporation law means those who hold dominant stock ownership. By pyramiding corporations, each of which holds dominant stock ownership in corporations at the next lower level, a very few persons with relatively small original investment could control the distribution of the return for the value of the labor, management, and capital contributed by thousands of investors and workers. 4 The disparity of incomes at the turn of the century indicates that those who built corporate empires used their control to greatly favor themselves. In 1900 Andrew Carnegie, who aggregated 180 companies into United States Steel, had a personal income of $23 million, at a time when the United States had no income tax. The average annual wage of all American workers was $400 to $500, with no social security, no workmen's compensation, and no unemployment insurance. 5 Even in the absence of a corporate empire the bargaining power of a corporate employer was vastly disproportionate to that of a single worker. The Supreme Court's "Ben Franklin" interpretation of the due process clause in "Andrew Carnegie" times was disastrous for natural persons seeking to cope with the corporate concentrations of economic power. Substantive due process blocked for forty years constitutional approval of some of the means, through voluntary and representative institutions, for dealing collectively with economic and social problems that could no longer be handled by individual efforts. Although this doctrine assertedly vindicated entrepreneurial rights," l invariably it was the corporation's viewpoint that prevailed at the expense of the individual's interest. The constitutional bar to legislation providing for collective bargaining, maximum hours, minimum wages, improved working conditions, prohibition of child labor, farm mortgage relief, employment insurance, workmen's compensation, and social security was removed in 1937 by the dramatic repudiation of the substantive due process doctrine. [i] t should be remembered that of the three fundamental principles which underlie government, and for which government exists, the protection of life, liberty and property, the chief of these is property." Children's Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 622 (D.C. Ct. App. 1922 ), aff'd, 261 U.S. 525 (1923 meeting the distortions and abuses of corporate concentrations of economic power had not been blocked by substantive due process. The antitrust laws should be included in this category, and probably the most significant measure was the progressive income tax. Labor unions and the income tax schedules have radically narrowed the gap between the income of workers and corporate executives and directors. The 1974 salary of the chief executive officer of Exxon (formerly Standard Oil of New Jersey) was $677,000, corporate executives salaries in the oil industry having risen thirty-three per cent from the previous year. 54 No doubt the impact of high-bracket tax obligations on that salary was offset by stock options and other forms of deferred compensation. It is surely significant, however, that Anthony Sampson, the author of a recent book in the tradition of muckraking journalism on the great oil companies, reports breathlessly that the directors of Exxon each "earn over $200,000 a year."" The comparison between the salaries paid by Exxon and Carnegie's earnings 5 6 exemplifies the narrowing-if still considerablegap between the income of corporate empire executives and that of workers. We have examined in some detail the effect of the doctrine of substantive due process on the efforts of natural persons to cope with corporate concentrations of economic power. What was the effect of the Court's embracing Lockean individualism as a tenet of constitutional law on the corporate entities that were aggregating the economic power? The Supreme Court equated them with natural persons, accorded them the benefits of the equal protection 58 and due process 5 " -clauses of the Constitution, and treated legal persons, whether corporate or natural, as equal 14 A. SAMPSON under the law even if they were decidedly unequal economically.
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Lo, the artificial legal entity of the corporation was born again. It had become even as a natural person, entitled to exercise dominion and sovereignty over itself and all its possessions lawfully acquired and lawfully used. To deprive it of the right to make decisions controlling any part of what it "owns"-except in punishment for unlawful acts of acquisition or use-would be to violate the economic scriptures according to Locke. Even in the mind of so astute a judge as Learned Hand, the artificial corporate entity was personified, replacing the natural person as the "competitor," and "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins. ' "
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Protecting entrepreneurial opportunity by limiting the assets that corporations are permitted to control, except incidentally to the protection of competition, is theoretically impossible, because otherwise the legal implications of "property" would be denied.
The fictional corporate person is as much an entrepreneur as is the individual. In weighing the appropriate remedy to be applied to the Standard Oil Company in 1911 the Supreme Court said that protection of the public against undue restraint of competition is the "foundation" upon which the statute rests but it must not be overlooked "that one of the fundamental purposes of the statute is to protect, not to destroy, rights of property.
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The result of placing the mantle of Lockean individualism on artificial corporate shoulders is that enormous concentrations of economic power were permitted within the control of a very few persons. Reflection perhaps not possible when these events first occurred should convince one that the correlation proposed by Locke between property ownership, decisionmaking power, opportunity and ultimately individuality does not hold in the case of the large corporation. Indeed, Berle and Means called our attention over forty years ago to the divergence of ownership and control in the corporation. 6 3 Failure effectively to enforce the anti-concentration aspects of the antitrust laws may have contributed to this development. It is disputed whether market-share concentration has been increasing, with the weight 6 "See cases cited note 52 supra. (1933 & rev. ed. 1968). of authority favoring the negative. 64 Yet great opportunities exist for assembling assets into corporate structures without eliminating competition. In any event, it is indisputable that tremendous amounts of material assets are controlled by small sets of executives of giant corporations. A comparison of the Standard Oil Company before the 1911 dissolution with just one of the thirty-eight companies that resulted from the dissolution demonstrates that enforcement intended to secure competition may have negligible effect on either the fact of concentration or the distorted relationship between property and control.
Beginning in the 1870's John D. Rockefeller and a few associates began to put together a combination of companies that would completely control the production, transportation, refining, and marketing of oil and oil products in the United States and some foreign countries. 65 The combination was organized in the form of a trust in 1882, but from 1899 it was organized under Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) as a holding company. 6 6 In 1911, the last year of the combination's existence it had total assets of $860.4 million, 70,000 employees, and earnings of $95 million. 67 The thirteen corporate officers and sixteen directors of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) had the authority to make the decisions controlling this economic power. 68 In fact, because there was some overlap between officers and directors and some directors were not active, management was in the hands of eight persons.
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As a result of the dissolution following Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 7 11 Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) became an operating company, one of the thirty-eight companies into which the combination was dissolved. Jersey Standard was by far the 11 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 658-65 (1974) 4 The Standard Oil experience is but one instance of escalating organized economic and social power visible throughout the United States. Capital needed to be concentrated in order to buy machines, build plants, and pay workers so that the benefits of industrialization could be realized. Workers had to resort to the power of private organization and government in order to wrest from corporate concentrations of economic power a fair share of the benefits of industrialization. Giant corporations have achieved tremendous economic power, far beyond what was necessary to exploit the 'opportunities of industrialization because corporate legal persons were equated with natural legal persons and accorded the rights of property which, in the Lockean tradition, are associated with the values of individualism.
In this perspective, the current public debate is seen to be too narrowly conceived. Two alternatives are assumed: Increase the regulation of business or free business from stifling regulation. In either case the individual is at the mercy of great concentrations of power-governmental in the one case, purportedly private in the other. There needs to be another alternative that gives primacy to the interests and needs of the individual.
Ralf Dahrendorf suggests just such an alternative in his 1974 Reith Lectures. He calls it the "new liberty. 75 Presently 71 Gibb & Knowlton, The Resurgent Years, 1911 -1927 1356-57 (1976 Just as Dahrendorf's "new liberty" departs from the European thesis that liberty inheres in government-directed redistribution, Americans need to reanimate the "old liberty" that values individual freedom above public or private centralized power. If this alternative is preferred, we must reject increased government regulation and at the same time limit the power of the private.organization of corporate capitalism. A place to begin would be to repudiate the identification of the corporate legal person with the natural person that resulted in the cultural approval and legal protection of individual entrepreneurship being extended to the smothering agglomerations of giant corporations. Corporations should have been recognized as useful organizational forms for concentrating the capital needed for industrialization, but also they should have been recognized as enemies of individual freedom. Every restriction on entre- preneurial opportunity should have been tolerated only after ample and explicit justification in terms of a sufficient economic benefit. Not one ounce of individual opportunity should have been yielded beyond that which was absolutely necessary to acquire the benefits of industrialization.
Of course this is hindsight. Given the central importance of the property concept in distributing the making of important decisions about utilization of the material resources of a society, and given the special importance of property in Locke's thought, it would have been impossible at the advent of the Sherman Act to rally sufficient support to limit the size of corporations in order to protect entrepreneurial opportunity. Is it possible now?
The use of the property concept to distribute decisionmaking about material assets, in fact, is appropriate only for natural persons, not for artificial legal persons such as corporations. In the past, decisionmaking was placed in those who: (1) Could effectively approach the gods who controlled events, (2) Could understand cause and effect in a rational world, (3) Could understand the process of historical materialism, and (4) Could responsibly control their own activities.
8 1' It is nonsense to talk about such characteristics with respect to an artificial legal person. The extent of the concentration of decisionmaking permitted to the corporation should not have been based upon the presumed capacity of a "person," but upon the economic benefit of such concentration.
The implication of the inaptness of using property concepts to distribute decisionmaking to corporations is not just that it should not have been done in the past, but also that the resulting giant concentrations of economic power can be undone without requiring dissolutions in terms of property concepts. The possibility has been before our eyes ever since Berle and Means pointed out the divergence between corporate ownership and corporate control. 8 subject to its provisions. Instead, it adopts the terms "businesses" and "business enterprises" to indicate sets of economic activities with respect to which controlling and directing decisions will be subject to regulation under the Act. One way of deconcentrating economic power in the United States without massively disrupting the stock market and the aspects of the economy dependent upon it, is to reinterpret "person" in the antitrust laws as referring not to corporations but to "businesses," understood functionally as centers of decisionmaking-decisions that direct and control a significant amount of economic activity. The sets of decisions that would constitute an independent "business" subject to the antitrust laws should be determined by balancing the value of providing maximum feasible entrepreneurial opportunity against the value of securing economic benefits such as economy of scale. 85 The factors to be included in the standards to be applied in this process will emerge with experience-as they have, for instance, with respect to the process of determining whether certain acts may have a substantial adverse effect on competition. Whether the economic activities are similar or dissimilar, and whether they are carried on at one location or many locations, would seem to be significant. Functionally, economists have always considered the plant to be the natural economic unit.
It might be necessary to have a preliminary step in antitrust cases to determine which units within a corporate structure are functionally independent and therefore subject to the antitrust laws, somewhat like the determination of the relevant market. Corporations would not be required to divest themselves of units 84 Id. § 3(1). 85 The premise that common ownership and control will not exempt intracorporate dealings from the antitrust laws has been recognized by the Supreme Court in one, albeit narrow, sense. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) ("common ownership or control of the contracting parties does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws"); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (section 1 of the Sherman Act may be violated by "a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common ownership"). The reach of these cases is questionable, and in no event do they extend beyond condemnation of intraenterprise conspiracy that restrains third party competitive activity. ATrORNEY GFNERAi2S NA-TIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT 34 (1955). The suggestion made in this article goes far beyond the Supreme Court's declaration of antitrust responsibility for certain intracorporate decisionmaking and would look to restraints within a large corporation, as well as those aimed at third parties. The recognized unit of antitrust responsibility in this proposal would be determined by functional economic considerations and not by reference to the legal distinction between parent and subsidiary relied upon by the Supreme Court.
